The raw data suggest that the global trend towards greater exchange rate flexibility that was evident before 1990 has since stopped. An optimum currency area (OCA) model of exchange rate regime choice is estimated. Four different schemes for classifying exchange rate regime are investigated. Trends in the explanatory variables made little difference to the trend towards greater flexibility before 1990 but have worked against it since, largely because of the reduction in inflation. Underlying preferences are still shifting gradually in the direction of greater flexibility.
INTRODUCTION
In the 1970s and 1980s, there was a clear trend towards greater exchange rate flexibility: an increasing proportion of countries chose to operate some form of floating exchange rate. As we show below, since 1990 this trend has stopped. The questions that we address here are: does this change represent a switch in preferences for given conditions, or have conditions simply become more favourable to pegs? If the latter, is this likely to continue in the future?
We examine this issue within the framework of an optimum currency area (OCA) model of the choice of exchange rate regime. We find that a float is more likely to be chosen if the inflation rate is above 10%, if the country is rich and large in population, and if it is less open to international trade. Trends in any of these factors will shift regime choices, even if preferences remain the same in the sense that, for given values of the OCA variables, the probability of choosing any given regime remains unchanged. Growing per capita GDP and population should gradually shift choices in the direction of greater flexibility, whereas increasing openness (and the possible sub-division of countries) should operate in the opposite direction. We show that before 1990, OCA factors made very little difference to the trend towards floating; but since 1990, OCA variables have shifted choices decisively towards pegs. By far the most important influence has been the decline in inflation rates in low-income and middle-income countries. This has obscured the fact that there is still an underlying trend in preferences towards greater exchange rate flexibility, although the trend is slower than before 1990. Our results are robust to the choice of exchange rate regime classification scheme. Now that the global disinflation process has largely run its course, observed regime choices are likely to reflect trends in preferences more closely in future.
EXCHANGE RATE CLASSIFICATIONS
The appropriate way to classify exchange rate regimes has been the object of a considerable research effort in recent years (see Tavlas et al., 2008, for a review) . In view of the lack of agreement about the issue, we consider four alternative schemes for which classifications are available for a large sample of countries for all years from 1971 to 2011. The four schemes are those of Shambaugh (2004) , Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) , Bleaney and Tian (2014) , and a modified Shambaugh scheme suggested by Bleaney et al. (2015) . The modification addresses the fact that the Shambaugh scheme has a rather different approach to devaluations to the others, which to a considerable degree explains its exceptionally low proportion of pegs.
The details of the schemes are 1 :
If the maximum and minimum of the log of the exchange rate against the identified reference currency (the US dollar being the default) do not differ by more than 0.04 over the calendar year, that observation is a peg. Alternatively, if there is a realignment so that the 0.04 threshold is exceeded, the observation is still a peg if the log of the exchange rate is unchanged in eleven months out of twelve. Thus effectively the level of the exchange rate is allowed to vary by ±2%, or alternatively by a realignment in one month and 0% in the remaining eleven months, for a peg to be coded. Note that basket pegs and crawling pegs may well not meet these criteria. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) Bleaney et al. (2015) [hereafter termed BTY]. The scheme replicates the principle of
Shambaugh (2004) Bleaney et al. (2015) . Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. *,**,***: significantly different from zero at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively.
MODELLING THE CHOICE OF REGIME
The literature on exchange rate regime choice has not yet settled on a definitive model, but the starting point is invariably optimum currency area (OCA) theory, upon which authors generally build to consider a variety of alternative hypotheses. Recent contributions include Bleaney and Francisco (2008) , Carmignani et al. (2008), von Hagen and Zhou (2007) , who provide a comprehensive survey of earlier empirical results, and Levy-Yeyati et al. (2010) .
Variables that typically make their appearance are country size, as measured by GDP, level of development (GDP per capita), openness to international trade (the ratio of exports plus imports to GDP), consumer price inflation, exposure to external shocks (the volatility of the terms of trade), the geographical concentration of trade, financial development (the ratio of M2 to GDP), and more recently liability dollarization (the ratio of foreign liabilities in the banking system to the money stock). Bleaney and Fielding (2002) present a model in which pegging involves choosing the exchange rate before external shocks are observed, but can offer greater anti-inflation credibility, so regime choice involves a trade-off between price stability and output volatility.
In the interests of maintaining the size of the sample (in some cases), and in other cases because they were not statistically significant, not all of these variables are included. Real GDP growth rates, the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to broad money and foreign direct investment as a percentage of GDP were all found to be insignificant. Because it would complicate the analysis of time trends, we also ignore the persistence of exchange rate regimes, as stressed by Bleaney and Francisco (2008) and von Hagen and Zhou (2007) , and do not include the lagged regime as a regressor. This means that the statistical significance of persistent explanatory variables is exaggerated by omitted variable bias, but this is not a central concern here. The explanatory variables that we include are population (as a measure of country size), per capita GDP, openness to international trade and inflation. Instead of the rate of consumer price inflation, we use binary variables for three ranges of the inflation rate: 10 to 20%, 20 to 50%, and above 50%; so the omitted category of inflation is below 10%. This formulation is designed to capture the effects of moderate inflation on regime choice, since the inflation rate coefficient is otherwise liable to be determined by a small minority of observations at the upper end. 
where  is the cumulative distribution function of the normal distribution; INF1020, INF2050 and INF50 are binary variables equal to one for consumer price inflation in the range 10-20% p.a., 20-50% p.a. and greater than 50% p.a. respectively; LPOP is the log of population; LPCGDP is the log of per capita GDP in 2005 US dollars; and OPEN is exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP; the as are parameters to be estimated; and u is a random error. The omitted category of inflation is below 10%. One could argue that a simple binary dependent variable is somewhat crude, and that a finer classification scheme for exchange rate regimes should be used. We have not chosen this option because there are several difficulties with it: (1) some categories in a finer classification are underpopulated; (2) their ordering on a scale of increasing flexibility is not always self-evident; and (3) some classification schemes use only a coarse classification.
3 It is quite common to transform the inflation rate x (in %) as 100x/(100+x); this mitigates but certainly does not eliminate the outlier problem. Country size is also frequently measured by GDP rather than population; in logs GDP is just the sum of per capita GDP and population, so the difference is minor. 4 Results are similar if we estimate a logit instead of a probit.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We first estimate equation (1) separately for 1971-90 and 1991-2011, as shown in Table 2 .
The results are pretty consistent, both across classification schemes and across the two time periods. The coefficients shown are estimated marginal effects, and for the inflation dummy variables they show the difference between a value of one and zero. Inflation is associated with a much higher probability of floating; for 1971-90, compared with inflation below 10%, the estimates show that inflation of between 10% and 20% increases the probability of floating by 5 to 10%, rising to 10% to 20% for inflation between 20% and 50% and to 30% to 40% for inflation over 50%. The one exception is the RR classification, where the coefficient is slightly positive for inflation over 50%, but this is based on a very small sample since RR put most high-inflation observations in a separate "freely falling" category. Table 1 , which means that the trend in observed choices matched the trend in preferences, and the net impact of OCA variables on the trend in choices was close to zero.
For 1991-2011, the picture is different. Three classification schemes show a significant negative time trend, but in the JS scheme, the estimated time trend is +0.2% p.a., although it is not significantly different from zero. Compared with the lower part of Table 1 , the estimated time trend in preferences is about 0.5% p.a. more negative than the time trend in choices, which suggests a trend effect of OCA variables of about +0.5% per annum. A closer analysis reveals that this is entirely the result of reduced inflation, which contributes about +0.4% per annum. 5 Inflation above 20% has become much rarer, as Figure 2 shows.
In order to estimate whether the change in time trend is statistically significant, and since the coefficients for the OCA variables are fairly similar between the two periods, we now estimate a model over the whole period, allowing only the time trend and the intercept term to have different coefficients before and after the end of 1990. In order to allow for the fact that the trend may have been particularly fast in the first few years after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, we start the sample at 1976. The results are shown in Table 3 .
The time coefficient now shows the estimated post-1990 trend in preferences, which is very similar in each case to that shown in Table 2 . The coefficient of time multiplied by the 1971-90 dummy shows the estimated difference in trend between the two periods. This coefficient is always negative, indicating a deceleration of the trend in preferences towards floating, and significant at the 5% level in three cases. The estimated shift in trend is particularly large in the case of JS, which as we have previously noted is something of an outlier. 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
To test the robustness of our results, we estimate a logit model instead of a probit. The results, which are shown in Table 4 , are very similar to those in Table 3 . With a logit specification, it is also possible to include fixed or random effects. Table 5 Tables 3 and 4 . In the case of BT and BTY this trend is still significantly negative at the 1% level, but the point estimate is about -0.4% per annum rather than -0.6%. For the RR model the post-1990 time trend is no longer significant, although still negative as in Table 3 , and for the JS model the positive post-1990 time trend is now statistically significant. The estimated inflation effects are still strong for three of the models, but are surprisingly weak in the RR model. Estimation of an OCA model suggests that the trend in global preferences towards greater flexibility of exchange rates has continued since 1990, despite the fact that floating has not become more common since then. The impact of the trend in preferences on observed choices has been offset in recent years by reduced inflation, which makes pegs more attractive, whereas before 1990 the trend in preferences was fully reflected in observed choices. Three out of the four classification schemes investigated show that this trend has nevertheless decelerated. If the global disinflation process has largely run its course, the recent divergence between trends in preferences and observed choices is likely to disappear.
